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Introduction
The economic crisis that the world faced in recent years has decisively contributed to the current instability in the Europe, triggering a new crisis which may be entitled "Sovereign
Debt Crises".
The debt levels of European nations have increased in recent years threatening the integrity of the Euro Zone.
Austerity measures, rescue plans, financing and refinancing of public debt are the current slogans of European leaders. In fact, there are deep financial and budgetary problems in the European Union members that require clear and decisive orders.
We are aware that the recovery process will be uneven, with a higher growth rate in some countries than others and several further reasons can justify such differences.
Given that fiscal policy is currently one of the main macroeconomic policy instruments available in each country, our analysis will focus in the fiscal policy on the revenue side; more precisely, we will study the main economic determinants of corporate tax revenue in European Union over the period 1998-2009. In this context it is important to highlight that we chose not to analyze the tax revenue as a whole but only the corporate tax revenue, taking into consideration the relevant role of corporate sector -the creation of new businesses and their investments, as well as the added value generated by them, which contribute to economic growth and development of a country.
In this sense, the purpose of this paper is to study the effect of structural, cyclical, international and institutional variables on the corporate revenue performance. We will analyze the impact of GDP, Government Deficit, Unemployment, Industrial Turnover, Trade Openness, High-tech exports, Corruption and other variables on the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP.
We must refer that, regarding this topic, there is a considerable number of studies. Some of them focus their analysis on the determinants of the government revenue, and some emphasize the factors to set the tax rates, while others examine the controversy relationship between tax rates and revenues. While some authors study developed countries, others prefer to understand developing countries. Notwithstanding, literature review shall be discussed in detail on Chapter 2 of this document.
Although some previous studies focus on the OECD members, developing countries or even a small number of European Union members (EU15), in a few years, in the present analysis we will extend the literature taking into account the 27 European Union members for the period 1998-2009.
Besides the more recent time series and the broader sample of European Union members, this paper explores the effective tax burden employing the EATR and the EMTR as exogenous tax variables.
With this analysis we would like to answer questions as simple as: Does a variation in the EATR or EMTR trigger a change in corporate tax revenue? Is there a revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate? Does Government Deficit or Trade Openness or still Corruption affect corporate tax revenue?
To help answering these and other questions we use econometric specifications applying the panel FGLS cross-section weights method.
This paper is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we analyze some papers that provide a theoretical and empirical knowledge about the present study; In Chapter 3, we explain the data and methodology adopted; Chapter 4 shows the empirical analysis and results; and, finally, Chapter 5 points out the main conclusions.
Literature review
The main determinants of tax revenue, corporate tax rate, as well as the paradox between corporate tax rate and its revenue have attracted the attention of many different researchers.
In this sense, there is a considerable set of studies examining the trends in corporate tax revenues, corporate income tax rates and, on the other hand, the relevant factors that influence these variables triggering the observed trends and fluctuations.
It is important to refer that most of the aforementioned analysis is focused on developed countries, but many other studies have focused their attention in developing countries, stressing institutional factors, which are characteristic of these countries.
This Chapter is divided into four parts:
-In "2.1. The determinants of corporate tax revenues" we briefly describe previous studies that analyze the effect of corporate profitability, foreign investment, statutory tax rate and tax base on revenues;
-"2.2. The determinants of corporate tax rates" outlines the effect of economic integration, initial rate, trade openness, country size and the relationship between corporate tax rate and individual tax rate on corporate income tax rates;
-"2.3. The determinants of tax revenue in developing countries" describes the impact of per capita income, imports, exports, agriculture, foreign debt and corruption on corporate tax revenue in developing countries;
-In "2.4. The corporate income tax rate -tax revenue paradox" we outline the controversy trends between tax rate and tax revenue, which could be explained, according to previous literature, by rising of profits, increasing of corporatization, income shifting and changes in effective tax burden.
The determinants of corporate tax revenues
The corporate sector and all its surrounding are important determinants of tax revenues.
Nevertheless, will be profits or losses an immediate influence of tax revenues? Auerbach and Poterba (1988) consider the sources of the decline in U.S. corporate income tax revenues over the period 1959 -1985 . Douglas (1990 does a similar analysis for Canada over the period 1960-1985. Both papers decompose the tax revenue share into the tax rate and the profit rate, as Taxes/Assets = Taxes/Profits * Profits/Assets, and they both conclude that it is declining profitability, rather than declining tax rates, that explains the bulk of the reduction in corporate income tax revenues.
However, the sources of the declining profitability are not systematically addressed, and the tax rate formulation does not allow a separate consideration of the statutory tax rate and the tax base.
Still in the corporate sector, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) consider the related question of how tax motivated transfer pricing issues affect corporate income tax revenues. Their empirical approach relates differences in tax rates (between the country and the OECD average) to a ratio of value added to labor compensation, with a data set that considers this relationship for 16 countries over 19 years (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . Findings indicate a negative relationship between value added and country tax rates, evidence that the authors interpret as indicating profit shifting toward low-tax countries. Therefore, the authors suggest that a one percent increase in the corporate income tax rate will lead to a small decrease in corporate tax revenues.
Another important factor that intuitively determines tax revenues is the country's relationship with foreign countries. Gropp and Kostial (2000) 
The determinants of corporate tax rates
Taking into consideration the above, the determinants of corporate tax rates should also be pointed out instead of the determinants of tax revenues. Hence, concerning the present subject, it would be interesting to address the question of how countries set their corporate tax rates.
Economic integration could be a factor of the strength of agglomerative forces, which establish the link between economic integration and tax competition. For this reason, Bretschger and Hettich (2002) examine the determinants of corporate income tax rates for 14 OECD countries between 1967 and 1996 and they find evidence in support of the hypothesis that greater international integration will lower corporate income tax rates.
Rodrik (1997) has a similar finding.
In addition, the tax background could also be an indicator of the current fiscal situation.
Mutti (2003) Another point of view is defended by Slemrod (2004) . The author considers variation in corporate tax rates over 90 countries and 4 years (1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 
The determinants of tax revenue in developing countries
In this subsection the institutional factors and the characteristics of developing countries demonstrate their relevance. Lotz and Morss (1967) find that per capita income and trade share are determinants of the tax share, and this finding has been replicated since.
In a similar study, Tanzi (1992) finds that half of the variation in the tax ratio is explained by per capita income, import share, agriculture share and foreign debt share.
From another point of view, various studies explain that collection of tax revenue is one of the important areas where corruption is most likely to arise (Galtung (1995) , Li (1997) , Toye and Moore (1998), Tanzi (2000) , Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) ).
Some of the factors that contribute to corruption in tax system are as follows:
-A complex and fragmented tax system increases the demand for corruption. Tax auditors and tax payers get advantages through complex rules, unclear laws, regulations and procedures of tax system. Complexity of regulation often allows the authorities to use their flexible powers and mount corruption in the system; -Complexity in the paying tax procedures leads to corruption;
-Another factor that fosters corruption is high tax rates, since they incentive tax evasion;
-In order to indulge corrupt behavior, individuals compare its benefits with the risk of detection and punishment, they engage in corrupt activities if they feel that the expected punishment is low; and -Finally, low wages of tax administration and tax payers also foster corruption.
In fact, the impact of corruption and tax evasion on tax revenue is not new in the field of public finance. In a series of paper Tanzi and Dvoodi (1997) have provided evidence that countries with high level of corruption tend to have lower collection of tax revenues in relation to GDP. Since some of the taxes paid by taxpayers are diverted away from public accounts. Sanyal et al. (1998) investigate the relationship between corruption, tax evasion and Laffer curve. The study explains that a corrupt tax administration leads to Laffer curve behavior.
Ghura (1998) concludes that the tax ratio rises with income and degree of openness, and falls with the share of agriculture in GDP. He also finds that other factors like corruption, structural reforms and human capital development affect the tax ratio. While a rise in corruption is linked with a decline in tax ratio, structural reforms and an increase in the level of human capital are associated with an increase in tax ratio.
In the same way, Gupta (2007) Similarly, Ajaz and Ahmed study institutional problems in developing countries, namely the corruption in tax administration and the low quality of governance. The study analyzes the effect of institutional and structural variables (corruption and governance) on tax revenues using panel data set for 25 developing countries during 1990-2005. Once again, the results show that corruption has an adverse effect on tax collection, while good governance contributes to better performance in tax collection.
To summarize, most studies find that per capita GDP and degree of openness is positively related to revenue performance, but a higher agriculture share and adverse institutional factors are more likely to lower it.
The corporate income tax rate -tax revenue paradox
As we will demonstrate in the following chapter, there are different trends in tax rate and tax revenue, while one increases the other shows significant falls.
In fact, these tendencies can be justified by a plenty of reasons related to, for example, a rise of profits, an increase of corporatization, or a growth of capital gains, besides changes in effective tax burden.
Auerbach (2006) points out a relatively stable ratio of U.S. federal tax revenues from nonfinancial corporations to GDP. He defends that this probably masks a declining ratio of corporate profits of these corporations relative to GDP and an increasing average tax rate on these profits. He claims that the average corporate tax rate rose steadily between 1996
and 2003 in large part because of the importance of tax losses, reflecting the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses under the corporate income tax and caused by a growing dispersion in profit outcomes among firms (i.e. many firms have losses even when the overall rate of profit is not low).
Sørensen (2006) This analysis differs from previous literature because it seeks to analyze the effect of some institutional factors in developed countries, regardless the fact that they are more characteristic and expressive in developing countries (e.g., Corruption). Additionally, although there are many studies related to some countries of European Union, this document differs either in the selected time series, or in the broader sample of countries belonging to the European Union.
Moreover, the EATR and the EMTR appear in this study as exogenous variables (a proxy of effective tax levels) using a model approach based on the Devereux/Griffith methodology.
Finally, in the present study corporate tax revenue will not be solely explained by changes in corporate income tax rate, but also by different economic and structural factors, some of them are mentioned above. Chapter 3 is divided as follows:
Data and methodology
-In subsection "3.1. Data Description", we outline the countries used in this study, we define the variables and present data statistics and data sources;
-The subsection "3.2. Econometric Model" provides, firstly, our general econometric model and, then, describes possible determinants of corporate income tax revenues, as well as their rationale and direction of influence;
-"3.3. Estimation Technique" describes the estimation method and some econometric assumptions used.
Data Description
The countries included in the analysis are the European Union members. These 27 countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and
United Kingdom
Variable definitions and data statistics are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 . 
EATR
Effective Average Tax Rate (%) -is a measure of the effect of tax on a non-marginal investment. A non-marginal investment is one that not only covers all of its economic costs but also provides an economic or above-normal profit to the investor. So the EATR is a measure of the proportion of pre-tax economic profit that the investor gets to keep after paying corporate tax. EATR may be a better indicator of the tax incentives facing a multinational corporation in deciding on a country for locating a large, discrete investment project, especially where the corporation has a strong expectation that it will earn economic profit due to a patent or similar source of market power. EATR was derived from the raw tax data and corresponds to overall mean of: Asset -industrial buildings, intangibles, machinery, financial assets, inventory; and, Source of Financeretained earnings, new equity and debt.
(+)
EMTR
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (%) -is a measure of the effect of tax on the return to a marginal investment. A marginal investment is one that just breaks even or covers all of its economic costs, including a return to the labour and capital that may be provided by the owner of the investment. A marginal investment returns a normal profit to the investor. The effect of tax on the return to a marginal investment depends not only on the statutory corporate tax rate but also on depreciation allowances and any available corporate tax concessions. EMTR was derived from the raw tax data and corresponds to overall mean of: Asset -industrial buildings, intangibles, machinery, financial assets, inventory; and, Source of Financeretained earnings, new equity and debt.
(+) Trade Openness (as % of GDP) -This variable corresponds to imports of goods and services plus exports of goods and services both as percentage of GDP, which represent the value of all goods and other market services received/provided from/to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.
GDP_PPS
HTECH EXPORT
High-tech exports (as % of total exports) -Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports.
CPI
Corruption Perceptions Index -The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory. The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries.
GOV DEFICIT
Cash surplus/deficit (as % of GDP) -Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. This cash surplus or deficit is closest to the earlier overall budget balance (still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now a financing item under net acquisition of financial assets). The factors used in the above equation are defined below. In the equation, i refers to a country and t refers to a year. Now, it is important to explain the list of independent variables and the rationale of their influences in ratio corporate tax revenues/GDP.
Structural factors
GDP per capita is a good indicator for the overall development of the economy and it is simultaneously used as a proxy for the size of the corporate sector. In fact, it is admissible that richer economies have a larger fraction of the economy in the corporate sector and, consequently, it is expected a positive relationship between these two variables and, therefore, between GDP and corporate tax revenue.
In the same way it may be considered that Government Deficit drives a country's revenue needs, so it is expected a positive sign.
Cyclical business factors
GOSMI correspond to the operating surplus of the corporate sector. This variable should be treated with caution, because it is not similar to corporate profits.
Notwithstanding, to address this issue we will also use the Industrial Turnover Index as another proxy for the corporate financial results, since it describes the development in the turnover of enterprises.
Despite these variables do not correspond to an economist's definition of corporate profits, they are the few available data for this analysis.
Unemployment Rate is used as a proxy to cyclical variables that should influence the profitability of corporate firms. In this sense, it is expected a negative relationship between this variable and corporate revenues.
Total Number of enterprises can represent the size of corporate sector. This variable is expressed in logarithm form.
International factors
Trade Openness can be a measure of factor mobility. The sign for Trade Openness is negative relative to tax rate, because it is expected a reduced scope for taxation as mobile factors can respond faster to changes in taxation, but positive in which concerns to tax revenue. Some studies consider this factor as an aspect of economic integration 2 . In the same way, other studies propose that more open economies should experience higher revenues at low tax rates and lower revenues at high tax rates 3 .
Regarding FDI, several studies understand that foreign investment is sensitive to tax rate differences. Thus, the investments in higher-tax countries are shifting toward low-tax countries, which, consequently, increase their revenues. Additionally, it could be considered a proxy to the ability of multinational firms to respond to international tax incentives.
Besides being considered a structural variable and a proxy to the development of the economy, the High-Tech Exports could contribute to increase the taxable income. Hence, it is expected a positive relationship with the endogenous variable.
Institutional factors
CPI compares every year the levels of corruption among public officials and politicians.
The index is based on the perception of business people and country analysts. When corruption becomes prevalent, higher tax rates lead to smaller net revenues, so it is expected a positive relationship between CPI and revenue collections 4 .
Estimation Technique
Standard estimation by OLS implies that all observations are homogeneous regarding the variance of disturbances or "errors" (homocedasticity), so they have equal weight in estimation.
Since this study analyzes a panel data, 27 countries over 12 years, we use cross-section weights through panel FGLS method of estimation assuming the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity.
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In this context, cross-section heteroskedasticity allows for a different error variance for each cross section. So the GLS for this specification is straightforward. First, it performs preliminary estimation to obtain cross-section specific residual vectors, and then it uses these residuals to form estimates of the cross-specific variances. The estimates of the variances are then used in a weighted least squares procedure to form the FGLS estimates.
In this subsection, it is important to refer that despite the FGLS approach considers the country's weight in the variance structure, we use variables like GDP to also demonstrate the specific size of the countries, now with a specific coefficient in the equation. In the same way, we used some similar variables, such as Industry Turnover and GOSMI.
Finally, in all analysis, when we have an expected sign for the variable, we used one-sided tests for the individual variables significance test, with exception of FDI and Government Deficit, which can reach positive or negative values, so, in these cases, we performed twosided tests.
Empirical analysis and main results
We divided this Chapter in four subsections, namely:
-"4.1. Description of main variables". This subsection presents an overview of the corporate tax rates (Statutory Tax Rate, EATR and EMTR) and shows the evolution of the ratio corporate income tax revenue/GDP in European Union;
-"4.2. Effective Average Tax Rates as tax variables". In this subsection, we outline the empirical results of the main specification, taking into consideration only one tax variable (EATR). The main findings suggest that all determinants are positive and significantly related to the dependent variable, with exception of Unemployment Rate, which presents a negative relation, as expected.
-"4.3. Effective Marginal Tax Rates as tax variables". Assuming as a tax variable the EMTR and some changes in the regressions described in subsection 4.2., our results are similar to those found in equations abovementioned, with exception of CPI, which loses its economic meaning. In addition, the findings reinforce the hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve.
-Finally, in subsection "4.4. Dummy Variables: Specific years and countries", we present a complementary study of the analysed regressions, considering the influence of the last two years of European Union enlargement and the specific factors of some European Union members (Greece, Portugal and Spain).
Description of main variables
In this section it is useful to examine the trends in the main variables for this dataset. In this sense, Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend of the Statutory Tax Rate, the EATR and the EMTR. As mentioned, Figure 1 presents The decline in EATR and EMTR over the time must be mostly driven by cuts on Statutory Tax Rates, since those rates highly depend on the Statutory Tax Rates.
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Even though the goal of this paper is not to analyse the wide dispersion of tax levels, there are several reasons for that. For example, size and the economic development of the countries can justify these differences. In this section we will also empirically estimate the relationship between corporate tax revenues and the variables described in Section 3. In the whole document, we distinguish our analysis and examine the hypothesis and equations taking into account two tax variables -EATR and EMTR.
The results of the regressions are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 .
Effective Average Tax Rates as tax variables
Since corporate tax revenue depends not only on tax rates as fiscal variables, we used some structural, cyclical business, international and institutional determinants to understand what influence tax revenues.
In this sense, several alternative specifications were considered to estimate the determinants of revenues across countries in European Union.
And, in fact, our empirical findings are in line with the previous literature for all variables analyzed. Firstly, it is considered the relationship between the corporate revenues as a share of GDP and the EATR. The tax term coefficient has the positive expected sign and a high degree of statistical significance.
Secondly, the data on GDP and Industry Turnover Index (two important variables to control the size of the countries and the corporate financial results) demonstrate the consistency with both the intuition and the previous literature (e.g., Auerbach and Poterba (1988) , Devereux et al. (2004) and Clausing (2007)). Thus, the results indicate that GDP and Industry Turnover Index are positive and significantly (at the 1% level of significance) related to the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP. Results indicate that a higher stock of FDI relative to GDP increases the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP. And, findings also indicate a positive relationship between the Trade Openness and the corporate tax revenue. This result is in line with the previous literature (Slemrod (2004) and Simon Loretz (2007)). In the present equation both variables are statistically significant.
9
In addition, we considered the following variables: the CPI -an institutional factor -and the Government Deficit -a structural factor. 10 As expected, both additional variables have a positive influence on revenues with a high degree of statistical significance. Thus, according to our results, an increase in the CPI score of one point may increase the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP by up to 0.172 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
So, once again, findings are in line with theoretical literature, since a lower level of corruption leads to a higher revenues collection and the Government Deficit drives a country's revenue needs (e.g., Sanyal et al. (1998) , Gupta (2007) and Slemrod (2004) ).
Finally, we included a new cyclical business factor -Total Number of Enterprises (this variable is expressed in logarithm form). One disadvantage associated with employing this variable is that the overall number of observations is cut due to an incomplete reporting.
However, the results indicate that this variable is positive and also statistically significant at a level of 1%. Again, these results are in line with the previous findings (Devereux et al. (2004) , Clausing (2007) , Piotrowska and Vanborren (2008) ). Note that the Trade Openness is the only variable in the specification that has a lower level of significance (5%). 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates as tax variables
Alternatively to the EATR, we also used the EMTR and made some relevant changes in the basic equations. With these changes we emphasize the nature of the relationship between tax rates and revenue collections, which is likely to be explained by a combination of factors.
In addition, in this subsection we attempt to obtain some empirical evidence related to the hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve.
10 We also tested other institutional variables, like Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of
Law, but we do not find a significant effect. As a result we do not include these factors in the regressions.
11 Sweden is excluded from the present analysis once no data on Government Deficit is available to this country and also Malta due to lack of data. According to other studies, the impact of corporate income tax rates on corporate revenues is modelled as a quadratic function. At low tax rates, an increase in the tax rate is likely to increase revenues and, on the other hand, at higher tax rates, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rate may exceed one, causing revenues to fall as tax rates increase. Thus, the capacity to collect taxes increases with the level of tax rates until a certain state from which begins to decrease due to the influence of distortion factors, such as corruption (Stinespring (2009) It shall be noted that the revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate will not necessarily correspond to the optimal corporate tax rate, but the relationship between tax rates and revenues still has a significant policy interest.
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Our results also suggest that Industry Turnover Index and Unemployment Rate are significantly related to the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP. In fact, these variables are statistically significant and present the expected signs. So, these determinants are in line with the previous literature (e.g., Auerbach and Poterba (1988) , Devereux et al. (2004) and Clausing (2007) Regarding the international factors, we find that FDI and Trade Openness are statistically significant (at the 5% and 10% level of significance) and have a positive effect on the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP.
Once again the Trade Openness and FDI coefficients have a positive sign, which are in line with previous studies (e.g. Ghura (1998), Slemrod (2004) , Gupta (2007) and Simon Loretz (2007)).
Additionally, our results show that the Government Deficit variable has a positive sign consistent with the foreseen (e.g. Slemrod (2004) 14 It is important to highlight that when we include the institutional factor CPI, this variable loses its economic meaning, despite it is statistically significant at the 1% level.
13 Note that an increase in the value of the Government Deficit variable represents an increase in the surplus and thereby a reduction on the deficit.
14 Sweden is excluded from the present analysis once no data on Government Deficit is available to this country also Malta due to lack of data.
Finally, note that in Equation (7a) we simply replace the Industry Turnover Index by the GOSMI variable. The results are similar to those found in previous equations.
Dummy Variables: Specific years and countries
We also experimented to introduce dummy variables indicating if the last two years of 
Conclusions
Our principal objective was to investigate corporate revenue performance of European Union over the past 12 years, using panel data set for 27 European Union members during the period 1998-2009. All estimates are based on panel FGLS cross-section weights method.
The main contribution of this study is that it extends the previous literature by considering all European Union members, more recent years, the use of effective tax burden through the EATR and the EMTR tax variables and, in addition, it analyzes the influence of institutional factors, such as corruption, in these developed countries.
The results show that structural factors like GDP or Government Deficit are statistically significant and positive determinants of corporate tax revenue, using either the EATR or the EMTR as tax variable.
We also looked the impact of cyclical determinants on the ratio of corporate tax revenue to In this sense, we can conclude that all analyzed variables play an important role in the ratio corporate tax revenue to GDP, but different determinants imply different effects.
Although the general of results are in line with the previous literature and predictions, several data limitations put constraints on the present analysis like the lack of data or variables that only represent few economic sectors, not covering all sectors (e.g., Total
Number of Enterprises).
In addition, it is generally acknowledged that the list of factors that could potentially explain the corporate income tax revenue is extensive, and our analysis only examines some of them. So many others determinants should be further studied.
Finally, our results may have implications for governments. Governments should consider the impacts of fiscal harmonization, define sustained international policies that promote Trade Openness, delineate policies to fight the unemployment, create a good economic atmosphere to rise the number of enterprises, increase tax evasion penalties and punishment for corrupt tax administration. 34  32  30  28  25   ----------34  32  30  28  25 ------------26  26  24  23  22  21 17 There is a notional interest deduction applicable since assessment year 2007 (income of 2006). The deduction is calculated as a percentage of the equity (incl. retained earnings), determined according to Belgian accounting law. The notional interest rate is based on the return on a 10-year state bond. The rates were for financial years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 20 Split-rate system: For distributed profits, the corporation tax is reduced to 30%. Local tax is deductible from the base of corporation tax and its own tax base. 21 Local tax is deductible from the base of corporation tax and its own tax base.
22 An additional solidarity tax is levied on a taxable base similar to that of the corporate income tax. 24 An additional social tax is levied on the corporate income tax base. 25 Local tax is deductible from the tax base of corporate income tax and its own base. 26 The municipality surcharge of 10% applies to the tax due which is equivalent to multiplying the corporate tax rate with 1.1. 27 The municipality surcharge of 1.5% applies to the taxable profit and is, therefore, added to the corporate tax rate. 
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